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The Poverty Gap in School Spending Following
the Introduction of Title I †
By Elizabeth U. Cascio and Sarah Reber*

The Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965 (ESEA) was a watershed in federal education policy. Its primary provision—a
block grant program under Title I—doubled
federal revenues for K–12 education in authorizing $1 billion ($7 billion in 2009 dollars) in
new federal funding for supplemental academic
programs for “educationally deprived” children
from low-income families. Title I was most
recently reauthorized under the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 and remains the cornerstone
of federal education policy today.
There is considerable debate over whether
additional school spending can narrow gaps
in achievement between poorer and richer students. But the first-order challenge to a compensatory intergovernmental grants program like
Title I is to ensure that it narrows gaps in school
spending between higher-poverty and lowerpoverty school districts. In a standard neoclassical model, school districts would be expected to
spend on education out of block grants as they
would any other source of income (i.e., in accordance with the income elasticity of education
demand)—potentially much less than dollarfor-grant-dollar. In response to a compensatory
federal program like Title I, the state may also
devote less tax revenue to education or distribute
that aid less progressively.
While there have been numerous studies of
the effects of Title I on student achievement,1 we

know little about how the introduction of Title
I affected the poverty gap in school spending.
Evidence on the spending impacts of Title I in
its earliest years suggests a “flypaper effect”—
a spending response that exceeds what would
have been expected on the basis of the income
elasticity of education demand—and, hence,
some spending convergence across richer and
poorer school districts. But these studies are limited in one way or another, either exploiting only
cross-sectional variation in Title I grant amounts
(Feldstein 1978) or focusing on only part of the
country (Cascio, Gordon, and Reber forthcoming). Evidence on Title I using dynamic variation
for the entire country (Gordon 2004) suggests
complete crowd-out within three years—and,
hence, no effect on the poverty gap in spending
across school districts—but is based on a more
recent (and more marginal) policy change than
that stemming from program introduction.
This paper explores how the introduction of
Title I may have affected school spending gaps
across richer and poorer states using state panel
data for the entire country. Federal policy is
uniquely suited to addressing regional inequalities, and, indeed, given the uneven regional distributions of poverty and school spending in the
United States, promotion of regional spending
convergence was a goal of this “War on Poverty”
program. Our newly collected data suggest that
Title I may have narrowed the gap in school
spending between richer and poorer states but
was far too small a program to eliminate this gap
entirely.
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School of Public Affairs, Department of Public Policy, 3250
Public Policy Building, Los Angeles, CA 90095 (e-mail:
sreber@ucla.edu).
†
To view additional materials, and author disclosure
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1
Borman and D’Agostino (1996) present a metaanalysis
of studies of the test score impacts of student participation
in nominally designated Title I programs. Van der Klaauw
(2008) and Matsudaira, Hosek, and Walsh (2012) estimate

the effects of Title I designation at the school, rather than the
student, level. Despite differences in empirical technique,
the studies are united in suggesting little achievement impact
of Title I.
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I. The Title I Program

The ESEA was far reaching, but its most
significant provision by far was Title I. Title I
funds were initially distributed primarily based
on counts of poor children from the 1960 census, and grants per eligible child were smaller
in states that spent less on average.2 Given that
higher-poverty states were, on average, lowerspending, this feature of the formula reduced
the program’s progressivity relative to what it
would have been with a single, national grant
per eligible child. Nevertheless, per-pupil Title I
formula amounts in the late 1960s were strongly
increasing in 1960 state child poverty rates, and
a linear poverty term alone can explain most of
the cross-state variation in per-pupil Title I formula amounts.
The size of the program, combined with
this feature of the funding formula, made the
distribution of overall federal education aid
compensatory. Figure 1 shows that between
the 1963–1964 school year (hollow markers)
and the 1969–1970 school year (solid markers)—before and after the introduction of Title
I—overall per-pupil federal revenue went from
being uncorrelated with the 1960 child poverty
rate to having a strong positive correlation with
it. The increase in slope is more than would be
expected on the basis of Title I, though not significantly so.
While the intended use of Title I funds is for
supplemental academic programs for “educationally deprived” children from low-income
families, Title I funds have often been used in
other ways. For example, audits from the program’s earliest years (Martin and McClure
1969) show that some school districts used
Title I funds to make capital investments. Other
school districts substituted Title I grants for state
and local funds, either by moving state and local
revenues away from the poorer schools that
received the Title I grants, or by lowering taxes,
in which case the grants were not even spent on
education. Regulations in the early 1970s sought
to improve targeting and to prevent crowd-out,
but expropriation remains difficult to prevent.

2
See Cascio et al. (2010) and Cascio, Gordon, and Reber
(forthcoming) for more details on the Title I formula and
implementation in the 1960s.

Per-pupil federal revenue (2009 dollars)
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Figure 1. The Relationship between Child Poverty
and Per-Pupil Federal Revenue before and after the
Introduction of Title I
Notes: Per-pupil federal revenue is expressed in real 2009
dollars and is drawn from HEW (various years). The 1960
child poverty rate is the number of Title I eligible children
in the state in 1965 (from US Office of Education 1965) to
the number of 5–17-year-olds in the state in 1960 (from
Minnesota Population Center 2011). Hollow markers represent 1963–1964, and solid markers represent 1969–1970.
Square markers represent Southern states, and circle markers represent all other states in the continental United States.
Regressions give each state equal weight.

II. Title I and the State Poverty Gap
in School Spending

Available data do not allow us to observe
school spending on poor children per se. Our
goal is therefore to understand how the introduction of Title I might have affected the gap
in overall school spending across richer and
poorer states.3 To this end, we obtained stateby-school-year–level data on current spending per pupil in average daily attendance for
all states in the continental United States from
1953–1954 to 2007–2008.4 These data show
that real per-pupil school spending increased by
3
We use the 1960 child poverty rate implicit in the initial
Title I formula, but our conclusions are substantively similar
if we use the overall poverty rate or measure poverty (child
or overall) in later years.
4
Fall Statistics of Public Schools (US Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), various years)
provided data on a biennial basis from 1953–1954 through
1979–1980. Thereafter, we drew data from all available
academic years from the Digest of Education Statistics (US
Department of Education, various years).
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Figure 2. The Relationship between Child Poverty and
Per-Pupil School Spending in 1963–1964 and 2006–2007
Notes: Per-pupil school spending is expressed in real
2009 dollars and is drawn from HEW (various years) and
Department of Education (various years). See Figure 1 note
for description of the 1960 child poverty rate. Hollow markers represent 1963–1964, and solid markers represent 2006–
2007. Square markers represent Southern states, and circle
markers represent all other states in the continental United
States.

over a factor of five over the period, from about
$2,000 per pupil in 1953–1954 to over $11,000
in 2007–2008 (2009 dollars).5 Given this, we
analyze per-pupil spending in percent terms,
using its natural log, rather than in dollar terms.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the
1960 child poverty rate and log per-pupil spending right before and well after Title I was implemented. In 1963–1964 (hollow markers), there
was considerable variation in spending across
states, and this variation was strongly related to
poverty. In 2006–2007 (solid markers), by contrast, the variation in log spending was virtually
unchanged from its pre-ESEA level,6 but the
analogous regression yields a slope that is half
as steep as it was in 1963–1964, with an R2 of
only 0.17.7
5
Our analysis gives each state equal weight, though our
findings are similar if we weight by enrollment or schoolaged population.
6
In 1963–1964, the standard deviation of log per-pupil
spending was 0.226; in 2006–2007, it was 0.217.
7
The figure also shows that while Southern states
(which we define as those in the former Confederacy) were

Slope on 1960 poverty rate in log spending regression
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ln per-pupil school spending, 2006–2007 (2009 dollars)

ln per-pupil school spending, 1963–1964 (2009 dollars)
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Figure 3. How the Relationship between Child
Poverty and Per-Pupil School Spending Changed over
Time
Notes: The figure plots slope coefficients from year-byyear regressions of log per-pupil school spending on the
1960 child poverty rate. Regressions give each state equal
weight. The dashed vertical line is placed at 1965, the year
that Title I was introduced. For sources, see Figure 2 note.

Was the poverty gap in school spending
diminished by the introduction of Title I, or
were there other forces at work? While we cannot rule out the importance of other factors,
we provide some evidence of a contribution of
Title I to these changes in Figure 3, which plots
slope coefficients analogous to those shown
in Figure 2, but on a year-by-year basis from
1953–1954 to 2007–2008. There is a clear break
in trend in 1965–1966, when Title I funds were
first distributed. Taking the pre-1965 trend in
the poverty gradient as the counterfactual, one
would conclude that Title I reduced the poverty
gradient in spending for a decade or so: after
a sharp decline in 1965–1966, the poverty gap
remained roughly constant in the two decades
following the introduction of Title I and began to
decline steadily again around 1990–1991.
While Title I thus appears to have stimulated
some convergence in school spending across
states, it would have needed to be a much larger
program to eliminate spending differences
across richer and poorer states. We calculate

s ignificantly lower spending on average, their lower spending was in line with their significantly higher poverty rates.
This suggests no “South effect.”

R 2 from log spending regression
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peaking at over 0.6 in 1988. While its predictive
power declined thereafter, per capita income has
continued to explain more variation in spending
in recent years. The predictive power of income
controlling for poverty points to a potential role
for income inequality in determining school
spending during the period when many states
reformed their school finance systems.9
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Figure 4. Did Title I Reduce the Power of Poverty
and Income in Explaining Cross-State Spending
Inequality?
Notes: The figure plots R2 from year-by-year regressions of
log per-pupil school spending on the 1960 child poverty rate
(solid circles), current per capita income (hollow circles),
and both variables together (x’s). Regressions give each state
equal weight. The dashed vertical line is placed at 1965, the
year that Title I was introduced. For sources, see note for
Figure 2.

that if there were no state or local crowd-out and
nothing else changed, the introduction of Title I
would have reduced the cross-state poverty gradient in spending by only about 15 percent.8
As mentioned above, Title I’s introduction
also appears not to have had much of an effect
on the variation in school spending across
states. A considerable share of this more recent
variation also appears to owe to per capita state
income, not poverty. Figure 4 plots the R2 from
year-by-year regressions of log per-pupil school
spending on the 1960 child poverty rate (solid
circles), on real per capita state income (hollow
circles), and on both (the x’s). Before the ESEA,
income was slightly more predictive of spending than poverty, but only marginally so. There
is a clear downward shift in 1965–1966, and the
predictive power of both poverty and income
declined continuously through the mid-1980s.
The predictive power of poverty and income
then diverged: the R2 for poverty continued to
decline, while that for income rose sharply,
8
In level terms, a 10 percentage point increase in the
1960 child poverty rate was associated with a reduction in
spending of $625 per pupil in 1963–1964 (based on a version of Figure 2 with per-pupil spending in levels), but only
a $91 increase in per-pupil Title I funding in 1969.

School spending has long been negatively
correlated with poverty at the state level, but this
relationship has weakened in the 50 years since
passage of the ESEA. We have presented evidence that the introduction of Title I contributed
to this trend. Nevertheless, Title I was a small
program relative to the spending differences
associated with poverty, and substantial poverty
gaps in spending remain. This is one potential
reason why Title I has appeared so ineffective
in closing the achievement gap. We nevertheless view these and any other conclusions as
tentative given the limitations of our data and
methodology.
Is Title I therefore failed policy? Not necessarily. The ability to withhold education funds
is a key policy lever for the federal government to encourage school districts to implement other reforms. At Title I’s inception, for
example, receipt of funds in the South was
conditional on meeting desegregation targets
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. These financial incentives worked, marking the beginning
of the end of racially separate schools in the
South (Cascio et al. 2010)—a process which
culminated in notable gains in black educational
attainment (Guryan 2004; Reber 2010; Johnson
2011). More recently, under the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001, receipt of Title I funds has
been tied to adoption of state school accountability systems—a policy which appears to
have reduced achievement gaps (Dee and Jacob
2011). Whether and how federal money might
buy progress in the future remains to be seen.

9
See Boustan et al. (forthcoming) and Corcoran and
Evans (2010) for more on the effects of income inequality
on spending.
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